Divide and conquer in DPA
• Implementations of cryptographic algorithms slowly mix the input with the key What about DPA on DES?
• First round S-box outputs depend on 6 key bits • Second round S-box outputs depend on ≤ 36 key bits
• Third round S-box output depends on ....
• DPA on first (last) two rounds is easier than cryptanalysis
• No need to protect inner rounds against DPA?
Contribution
• We present "A first-order chosen-plaintext DPA attack on the third round of DES"
• Requires ability to choose inputs • Otherwise standard DPA attack • Complexity is that of 2-3 DPA attacks on the first round of DES + some minimal differential cryptanalysis
• Two steps
• DPA with chosen inputs to deactivate part of the state and Jaffe's trick to push unknown constants into the key guess
• Recovers "blinded" round 2 keys
• Differential cryptanalysis to recover round 1 keys
• Unblind round 2 keys • Invert key schedule 14 November 2017 Benedikt Gierlichs -DPA on 3rd round of DES 9
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• Target leakge of L3 • Choose inputs s.t. L0 varies and R0 const
• Recover blinded round 2 key
• Repeat with different const R0' and R0''
• Recover also
Step 2: untangle terms k1 and E(C)
• Classic differential attack on 1 round Feistel to recover k0 • Consider differences
• First round output differences after E (invertible)
• We know the input difference R0  R0'
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• Given input and output difference, key recovery differential attack for K0
• Divide and conquer: S-box by S-box, simple
• For one S-box
• Guess on 6-bit key • Compute S-box output difference for R0 and R0'
• Apply E • Equals corresponding part of ? Discard key guess if not.
• Repeat for other output differences ' and ''
• Intersection of key candidates is expected to yield unique and correct K0
• Given K0 compute
• And unblind the DPA recovered
• Invert DES key schedule to obtain DES key 
